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Quotas and the stability of implicit collusion

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Published by Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge, Mass .
Written in English


Book details:

Edition Notes

Other titlesImplicit collusion, Quotas and the stability of.
Statementby Julio J. Rotemberg and Garth Saloner.
SeriesWorking paper / Alfred P. Sloan School of Management -- WP# 1778-86., Working paper (Sloan School of Management) -- 1778-86.
ContributionsSaloner, Garth.
The Physical Object
Pagination40 p. ;
Number of Pages40
ID Numbers
Open LibraryOL17945577M
OCLC/WorldCa15250404

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Quotas and the Stability of Implicit Collusion This paper shows that the imposition of an import quota by one country can lead to increased competitiveness; protection can reduce the price in the country that imposes the quota, the foreign country, or both. Quotas and the Stability of Implicit Collusion Julio J. Rotemberg, Garth Saloner. NBER Working Paper No. Issued in June NBER Program(s):International Trade and Investment Program, International Finance and Macroeconomics Program. This paper shows that the imposition of an import quota by one country. Quotas and the Stability of Implicit Collusion.. [Julio J Rotemberg; Garth Saloner; National Bureau of Economic Research.] -- Abstract: This paper shows that the imposition of an import quota by one lemoisduvinnaturel.comct: can lead to increased competitiveness; protection can reduce the price in lemoisduvinnaturel.comct: country that. This paper shows that the imposition of an import quota by one country can lead to increased competitiveness; protection can reduce the price in the country that imposes the quota, the foreign country, or both. This emerges from a model in which the firms are assumed to sustain collusion by the threat of reversion to more competitive lemoisduvinnaturel.com: Julio J. Rotemberg and Garth Saloner.

The presence of implicit collusion is not the only reason why quotas may result in increased competition in both markets. Indeed we demonstrate that the model developed in Dixit and Kyle () can be modified to show that potential entry can have the same effect. Tariffs vs. quotas with implicit collusion [Julio Rotemberg, Garth Saloner, Sloan School of Management] on lemoisduvinnaturel.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. This is a reproduction of a book published before This book may have occasional imperfections such as missing or blurred pagesAuthor: Julio Rotemberg, Garth Saloner. Enter the terms you wish to search for. Tariffs vs. Quotas with Implicit Collusion. In This Section. QUOTAS WTTH lemoisduvinnaturel.com COLLUSION By Julio J. Rotemberg and Garth Saloner* Working Paper # Revised April MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 50 MEMORIAL DRIVE CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS TARIFFS VS. QUOTAS WITH IMPLICIT COLLUSION By Julio J. Rotemberg and Garth Saloner* Working Paper # Revised April riui^'-' .

This paper investigates the impact of trade restrictions on firms' capacity to maintain collusive agreements in an international "dominant group" cartel. The author shows, in particular, how tariffs and quotas can have different effects on the stability of these arrangements according to the composition of the lemoisduvinnaturel.com: Robert Rothschild. The literature on oligopolistic competition abounds with various implicit statements about the ‘stability’ of collusive arrangements. A well known example is provided by comments on price arrangements between the sellers in a given lemoisduvinnaturel.com by: Regular Article. Collusion in the Indian Tea Industry in the Great Depression: An Analysis of Panel Data☆☆☆. Abstract. This paper uses firm level data to examine the effectiveness of agreements to reduce output in the Indian tea industry during the Great lemoisduvinnaturel.com by: On the Stability of Collusion Claude d’Aspremont and Jean Jaskold Gabszewiczy 1 Introduction The literature on oligopolistic competition abounds with various implicit statements about the ‘stability’ of collusive arrangements. A well known example is provided by comments on price arrangements between the sellers in a given industry.